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In Germany, the tax loss carry-forward of corporations significantly increased over the last 
decade. At the same time only a small percentage of losses have been effectively offset in the 
following periods. One potential reason for this puzzle is that stricter loss offset restrictions 
have been introduced in recent years. I use a newly developed micro simulation model for the 
corporate sector in Germany to evaluate the fiscal effects of these restrictions. Additionally, 
distributional breakdowns concerning the amounts of tax loss carry-forward and the effects of 
loss offset restrictions are provided. I find that the restrictions on the use of tax loss carry-
back  are  rather  ineffective  while  the  newly  introduced  minimum  taxation  considerably 
increases yearly tax revenue by 1.1 billion €. 
  
JEL classification: H25, C8 
Keywords:  micro  simulation,  loss  offset  restrictions,  corporate  taxation,  tax  loss  carry-
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1.  Introduction 
 
In  Germany,  corporations’  tax  loss  carry-forward  significantly  increased  during  the  last 
decade. In 2001
1, losses which can offset future profits reached a volume of € 388 billion. At 
the same time adjusted gross income
2 of all corporations was € 91.9 billion. Hence, accrued 
tax losses from the past exceed adjusted gross income by the factor four. It amounts to 18 % 
of German GDP. 
 
At present, the German statutory corporate tax rate is 25%. This means that this volume of 
tax-loss  carry-forward  is  worth  €  97  billion.  With  the  2008  reform  of  business  taxation 
(Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz  2008)  the  tax  base  will  be  broadened  and  the  statutory 
corporate tax rate will be cut to 15 % from 2008 on. Hence, effectively the reform devalues 
corporations’ tax loss carry-forwards. Corporations may make use of their tax loss carry-
forwards  in  the  future,  and  thus  unused  losses  from  the  past  potentially  lower  corporate 
income by an amount of € 58.2 billion. As no provisions for this event have been included 
into the federal budget so far, potential tax deficits are hanging over the treasury like the 
sword  of  Damocles.  Corporations’  tax  loss  carry-forwards  can  cause  substantial  fiscal 
problems in the future.  
 
In recent years, the government has reacted with several tax reforms restricting the use of 
losses from other periods. Since 1999 tax losses can only be carried back into the previous 
period. Furthermore the volume of the tax loss carry-back was limited to € 1.0 million in 1999 
and 2000. Since 2001, its volume has been further restricted to € 0.5 million. Additionally, a 
minimum taxation (Mindestbesteuerung) restricting the use of tax loss carry-forwards was 
introduced in 2004. Furthermore, the use of losses acquired with the purchase of a corporate 
shell (Mantelkauf) has been severely restricted.  
 
Restrictions on the use of tax losses from other periods possibly explain why only a small 
amount  of  profits  have  been  offset  against  losses  in  the  past.  However,  so  far,  empirical 
studies evaluating the effects of German loss offset restrictions have been rare. Müller (2006) 
have confined himself to identify the total amount of accumulated corporate losses. Other 
authors  provided  case  studies  and  back-on-the-envelope  calculations  to  determine  the 
                                                 
1 This is the year of the latest data available. 
2 The profit as shown in a corporation’s tax balance sheet minus certain expenses and other “adjustments” is 
called  adjusted  gross  income.  Subtracting  a  potential  tax  loss  carry-back  or  carry-forward  and  allowable 
deductions for certain corporations results in “taxable income”.   3 
economic effects of German tax loss offset restrictions (e.g. Niemann, 2004). Present micro 
simulation studies of the corporate sector have concentrated on the consequences of different 
local business taxation systems (Fossen/Bach, 2007) and on the effects of corporate reform 
bills (Bach et al., 2007). Only for non-incorporated companies, Müller (2006) performed a 
micro simulation concerning the effects of the restricted use of losses. 
 
For the German corporate sector, to my knowledge, there is no empirical analysis on the fiscal 
and distributional effects of the restrictions in the use of tax loss carry-forwards and the tax 
loss carry-back. This gap is mainly due to the difficulty to get access to detailed corporate tax 
information at the micro level which is needed to model the corporate taxation system. 
 
In  this  paper,  I  make  use  of  a  newly  developed  micro  simulation  model  for  the  German 
corporate sector
3 based on the corporate income tax statistics 1998 and 2001 (Gräb, 2006). 
This  new  model  allows  to  shed  light  on the  question  whether  it  is  because  of  fiscal  law 
restrictions that losses are only used on a small scale. It also makes it possible to evaluate the 
fiscal and distributional effects of the tax reforms of 1999 and 2000, which tightened the 
offset of profits against losses. 
 
The remainder of the paper is the following. In the next section, I describe the changes in the 
fiscal law concerning the use of tax loss carry-backs and carry-forwards that occurred in 
1999/2000 and in 2004. Furthermore, the reforms are put into an international perspective and 
general developments are discussed from the point of view of public finance. In the third 
section, the data and some stylised facts are described. Section four contains a presentation of 
the new micro simulation model for the German corporate sector, which is used to estimate 
the fiscal effects of reforms concerning the offset of profits against losses from the past. In 
section five, the empirical results are presented and discussed regarding the effects on the 
fiscal  tax  revenue.  Furthermore,  I  evaluate  the  reforms’  distributional  effects  by  size  and 
industry. Section six concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 This model is part of the business tax simulation model BizTax of the DIW Berlin.   4 
2.  The fiscal framework of loss offset in international comparison 
 
2.1.  German fiscal law and the offset of losses 
The German Corporate Income Tax Law refers to the loss offset regulations of the German 
Personal Income Tax Law. Offsetting losses from different investments or income sources 
within one period is unrestricted for corporations (Verlustausgleich).
 Furthermore, they are 
allowed to charge present profits against losses from other periods. Until 1999, profits could 
be offset up to a value of € 5.1 million per year against losses from the following two periods 
(loss carry-back)
4; at the same time they could be offset without limit against losses from the 
past (loss carry-forwards). In recent years, these regulations have been tightened.
5 First of all, 
the tax loss carry-back has been considerably restricted since 2000. Since then, losses can be 
carried back one period only. Furthermore, the carry-back volume was gradually reduced to € 
511,500 in 2001 (1999 and 2000:  € 1 million).  
The  rules  on  offsetting  profits  against  tax  loss  carry-forwards  have  been  additionally 
restricted by the so-called minimum taxation (Mindestbesteuerung) since 2004. Before, the 
use of loss carry-forwards had not been restricted in time or volume. Since then, corporations 
can fully offset profits against loss carry-forwards in the amount of € 1 million. If profits 
exceed this threshold only 40 % of the exceeding amount can be deducted. This de facto 
capped the use of tax loss carry-forwards. Concerning time, the use of tax loss carry-forwards 
is still unlimited. 
Table 1 summarises the changes in rules concerning the duration and volume of the tax loss 
carry-back and the loss carry-forward.  
 
Table 1: Rules for the inter-period use of tax losses 
  carry-back volume  carry-back period 
1984 - 1998  DM 10 million (about € 5.1 million)  2 years 
in 1999/2000  DM 2 million (about: € 1 million)  1 year 
since 2001  € 511.500  1 year 
     
  carry-forward volume  carry-forward period 
1984 - 2003  unlimited  unlimited 
since 2004  € 1 million  unlimited 
 
                                                 
4 §8 (1) Corporate Income Tax Law 1998 (Körperschaftsteuergesetz) in conjunction with §10d Income Tax Law 
(Einkommensteuergesetz) 
5 Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002, BGBl I, 1999, no. 15, pp. 402-497.   5 
2.2.  International  comparison  and  evaluation  in  terms  of  public  finance 
principles 
Table 2 shows the rules for the inter-period use of tax losses in the member states of the 
European Union as well as in Canada, Japan and the United States. No country provides full 
immediate  tax  refund  for  all  tax  losses.  An  immediate  tax  refund  is  only  ensured  if  the 
corporation had positive profits in the year(s) before and if an unlimited tax loss carry-back is 
allowed. There are only few countries that allow companies with positive taxes in the years 
prior to the loss to carry back the loss and to receive a tax refund: France, Great Britain, 
Ireland,  Netherlands,  Canada,  Japan,  the  United  States  and  Germany.  In  those  countries 
permitting a tax loss carry-back, the time a loss carry-back can be used is very restricted. By 
contrast,  the  possibility  to  make  use  of  tax  loss  carry-forward  is  widespread  among  the 
presented countries’ fiscal laws. However, many of them limit the use of loss carry-forward to 
a certain number of periods. In Germany and Austria the use is not restricted in time but in its 
volume (“minimum taxation”). Poland also has a minimum taxation and additionally limits 
the use of tax loss carry-forward to five years. These three countries introduced a minimum 
taxation in order to temporally stretch the use of losses. 
 
In  public  finance  theory  it  is  common  knowledge  that  imperfect  loss  offset  rules  in  the 
corporate  income  taxation  may  seriously  alter  incentives.  There  is  a  wide  literature  on 
“asymmetric taxation”, i.e. the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses: Gains are taxed 
immediately while losses do not necessarily lead to an instantaneous refund at the same rate. 
An immediate refund is only obtained if the current loss can be carried back because fiscal 
law allows for unlimited loss carry-back and because the corporation has had positive taxable 
income in the years prior to the loss. Any other losses that cannot be offset by loss carry-back 
must be carried forward. As there is no interest payment this renders loss carry-forwards and 
investments which initially lead to losses relatively unattractive. Note this is even more true in 
those  countries  that  only  allow  losses  to  be  carried  forward  for  a  certain  time.  Thus, 
corporations investing in risky projects, which may involve temporary losses, are subject to 
higher effective tax rates than they would be under symmetric taxation rules.  
 
Several researchers used data from US corporations to analyse the impact of the imperfect 
loss  offset  on  the  user  cost  of  capital  and  on  the  incentives  to  invest  (among  others 
Altshuler/Auerbach,  1990;  Auerbach/Poterba,  1987;  Auerbach,  1983  and  1986; 
Cooper/Franks, 1983; Cordes/Sheffrin, 1983; Mintz, 1988). They conclude that imperfect loss   6 
offset provisions discriminate against risky investments. Niemann (2004) used Monte-Carlo-
simulations to determine the (negative) effects of the minimum taxation on investment.
6  
 
Table 2: Rules for the inter-period use of tax losses within the European Union, Canada, 
Japan and the Unites States (in 2006) 
 
carry-back  carry-forward  country 
volume  period  volume  period 
Austria  -  -  75 % of profits  unlimited 
Belgium  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Cyprus  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Czech Republic  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Denmark  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Finland  -  -  unlimited  10 years 
France  unlimited  3 years  unlimited  unlimited 
Germany  511,500 €  1 year  € 1 million,  above 




Great Britain  unlimited  1 year  unlimited  unlimited 
Greece  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Hungary  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Ireland  unlimited  1 year  unlimited  unlimited 
Italy  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Latvia  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Lithuania  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Luxembourg  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Malta  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Netherlands  unlimited  3 years  unlimited  unlimited 
Poland  -  -  50 % of the annual 
loss 
5 years 
Portugal  -  -  unlimited  6 years 
Slovakia  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Slovenia  -  -  unlimited  5 years 
Spain  -  -  unlimited  15 years 
Sweden  -  -  unlimited  unlimited 
Canada  unlimited  3 years  unlimited  10 years  
(non-capital 
losses) 
Japan  unlimited  1 year  unlimited  5 years 
United States  unlimited  2 years  unlimited  20 years 
Source: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie/PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006). 
 
The  empirical  evidence  on  taxes  and  the  financial  structure  of  companies  has  been  less 
conclusive. While earlier studies (e.g. Auerbach, 1985; Bradley et al., 1984; Titman/Wessels, 
1988) have not found support for the theoretical prediction that leverage levels are related to 
firms’ nondebt tax shields, Givoly et al. (1992) identify a substitution effect between debt and 
nondebt  tax  shields,  such  as  tax  loss  carry-forwards.  Graham  (1996)  and  MacKie-Mason 
(1990) explicitly analyse the financing structure of companies in the presence of loss carry-
                                                 
6 To account for these negative effects of asymmetric taxation on investment, Graham and Lemmon (1998) 
present the approach of a simulated marginal tax rate which explicitly accounts for tax loss offset. Ramb (2004) 
makes use of this method and estimates an investment function for Germany taking loss offset into account.   7 
forwards.  They  also  discern  a  significant  negative  effect  of  tax  loss  carry-forwards  on 
financing with debt. 
 
In a nutshell, imperfect loss-offset provisions substantially distort corporations’ investment 
and financing decisions. Whose decisions will mostly be affected by the reforms tightening 
the tax loss offset? To answer this question, section five complements the reforms’ fiscal 
effects by a distributional analysis of the legal changes in the use of tax losses. Before coming 
to the empirical results, let us first have a look on the stylised facts on loss offset and on a 
short description of the micro simulation model for the German corporate sector.  
 
3.  Does the tax loss carry-forward go berserk? 
 
For the last decade we have seen the tax loss carry-forward volume skyrocketing in Germany 
(Bach and Dwenger, 2007). Corporations’ tax loss carry-forward increased from € 81.8 billion 
in 1991 to € 388 billion in 2001 (figure 1); the volume of losses from the past that can be 
offset against future profits more than quintupled within a decade. About 54 % (405,560 
corporations)  of  all  companies  subject  to  the  corporate  income  tax  had  a  tax  loss  carry-
forward at the end of 2001.  
 
Figure 1: Corporations’ tax loss carry-forward that can be offset against future profits. 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations. 































tax loss carry-forward, aggregate tax loss carry-forward, on average  8 














tax loss carried back tax loss carried forward
The increasing number of corporations from 546,420 to 813,017 (increase by 49 %) in the 
same period cannot be the only reason: The increase in the tax loss carry-forward on average 
runs parallel to the increase in the tax loss carry-forward on aggregate (figure 1). Hence, one 
would expect that companies offset a large share of present profits against losses from the past 
every year. 
 
However, this did not happen: Corporations do not really seem to use their tax loss carry-
forwards as a large share of these potential tax credits remains unused (figure 2). In 2001, 
only about € 20 billion out of € 388 billion, i.e. 5 % of the tax loss carry-forwards were used 
to offset profits. Thus, about 17 % of the total of profits was offset against a tax loss carry-
forward in 2001. This is less than in 1998 when 21 % of profits were offset against losses 
from the past (volume of about € 27.1 billion or 10 % of the accumulated tax loss carry-
forward). The use of the tax loss carry-back remained stable at around € 1 billion. 
 















Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations. 
 
How can the puzzle of unused tax loss carry-forwards be explained? One potential reason are 
restrictions in tax loss offset rules that have been introduced recently. In the following each 
restriction will be scrutinized for its fiscal and  distributional effects. All analyses will be   9 
based on comprehensive tax data sets on German corporations for the years 1998 and 2001
7 
and the newly developed micro simulation model for the German corporate sector, which 
allows for the great heterogeneity between corporations. 
 
4.  The micro simulation model for the German corporate sector 
 
Micro simulations have become an increasingly popular instrument for the ex ante analysis of 
policy reforms and for their ex post evaluation. They are a method to estimate the outcome of 
tax and social policy reform projects: In the first step, reform effects are estimated for every 
single  agent  (i.e.  company).  As  a  second  step,  these  individual  effects  are  aggregated  to 
calculate the overall fiscal and distributional consequences of the reform. 
 
By this method, heterogeneous characteristics of the agents (size, region, legal form, industry, 
income etc.) can be taken into account. However, micro simulations require a representative 
data set with detailed statistical information for every single agent. This may explain why 
micro simulation models evaluating changes in corporate income taxation are still rare. In 
Europe, models have been developed  within the DIECOFIS project for  Italy  and the UK 
(Bardazzi et al., 2004 and Parisi, 2003). Furthermore, the micro simulation model BizTax has 
been developed for business taxation in Germany (Bach et al., 2007; Fossen/Bach, 2007). As 
all analyses in the following are run with a newly developed model for the German corporate 
sector based on corporation tax data, the model is briefly described.  
 
The corporate micro simulation model used here is part of the business taxation model BizTax 
and is based on company’s tax returns data. Among other declarations, detailed information 
on  the  potential  and  realised  volume  of  tax  loss  carry-forward  and  of  carry-backward  is 
available. Furthermore, the data set contains the individual tax return for the corporate income 
tax and the official corporate income tax. Thus, it is possible to recalculate the corporate 
income tax and to compare it to the official one. After correcting some obvious errors in the 
data the simulated corporate income tax liability for 2001 corresponds to the amount actually 
assessed  by  the  tax  authorities  for  99.2  %  of  all  corporations  (1998:  99.9  %).  These 
companies accounted for 99.6 % (1998: 99.4 %) of the whole corporate income tax revenue. 
Hence, one can be confident that the micro simulation model BizTax successfully reflects the 
fiscal regulations applicable in the different years. 
                                                 
7 Researchers can use these data sets in the Forschungsdatenzentrum of the German Statistical Offices.   10 
As denoted above there is not only detailed information on the realised tax loss carry-forward 
and carry-back, i.e. on the offset of profits against losses that was possible under the effective 
legislation, but also on the potential tax loss carry-forward and carry-back. This allows me to 
simulate the reform scenarios before they became effective and to compare them with the 
before-reform state. These comparisons provide the possibility to estimate the effects of the 
changes in the loss-offset provisions for all corporations that are subject to corporate income 
tax. As changes in behaviour which may be triggered by the reform are not represented in the 
model, the estimated effects can be regarded as short-run or first round effects. The analysis 
of the restrictions in volume of the tax loss carry-back is based on data for the year 1998 – the 
year before the reform of tax loss-offset provisions was adopted and became effective. Micro 
simulations evaluating the effects of the minimum taxation are based on data for the year 
2001, which precedes the discussion about the minimum taxation.
8 By resting my analyses on 
data sets before the reform became publicly known, I exclude fiscal effects of behavioural or 
long-term responses to the reform. 
 
In 1999 and 2000, the loss carry-back
9 was restricted from € 5.1 million to € 1 million                 
(€ 511,500 in 2001). At the same time the possibility to carry tax losses back was moderated 
from two years to one period. Unfortunately, there is no information about the tax loss carry-
back over two periods in the data set. Hence, it is not possible to empirically disentangle the 
effects of the cut in the number of periods a loss may be carried back and in the amount of the 
tax loss potentially carried back. As a result, the micro analysis in the following concentrates 
on  the  restriction  in  volume.  Scenario  1  simulates  the  loss  offset  provisions  that  became 
effective in 1999 and 2000. Scenario 2 reflects the regulations in volume that have been 
effective since 2001. The simulated corporate income tax for 1998 will serve as a reference 
scenario.  Since  2004,  legal  provisions  for  the  use  of  loss  carry-forwards  have  been 
additionally tightened by the minimum taxation, which is evaluated in scenario 3. 
 
For  all  scenarios,  not  only  the  fiscal  but  also  the  distributional  effects  are  presented: 
Corporations are very heterogeneous and not all of them have been affected in the same way. 
In order to analyse the distributional effects of the tightening of tax-offset provisions, I break 
down the reform’s fiscal effects along subgroups, i.e. along size (adjusted gross income) and 
industries. 
                                                 
8 Note that up to now the data on corporate income taxation are available every three years. So far, data for 2004 
have not been available. 
9 Note the tax loss carry-back may be lowered or suspended at the request of the company. Empirically, this 
option is not very interesting as nearly no corporation makes use of this choice.   11 
5.  Empirical results 
 
5.1. The effects of the restriction in the use of a tax loss carry-back 
The restriction to carry tax losses back to a volume of € 1 million only (scenario 1) did not 
have large effects on the corporation tax assessed. Tax revenues increased by € 10 million, i.e. 
less than 0.05 % of total corporate tax revenue.  
While 11,999 corporations had an adjusted gross income of € 1 million or more, only 49 
corporations  reported  a  loss  above  this  threshold  in  1999  and  would  hence  have  been 
hampered in their use of tax loss carry-back under the new regulation. These companies could 
partly compensate for a lower tax loss carry-back by offsetting the remaining profit against a 
potential tax loss carry-forward. Thus, a minor sum of tax loss carry-forward is used as a 
compensation for a lower tax loss carried back. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix contain 
more details concerning the distributional effects of scenario 1. 
Capping the use of tax loss carry-back to € 511,500 is more effective, as scenario 2 shows. 
The simulated aggregate corporate income tax increases by € 55 million (0.5 % of corporation 
tax  assessed  in  1998).  Compared  to  scenario  1  the  additional  income  tax  more  than 
quintupled. Nevertheless, the number of firms which are affected by this new regulation still 
remains small: Effectively, only 366 corporations suffer a loss of more than € 511,500 in 
1999,  which  they  could  offset  against  profits  in  1998.  Hence,  less  than  0.05%  of  all 
corporations liable for corporate income tax are limited in the use of their tax loss carry-back. 
Some of these corporations can compensate the limited use of a tax loss carry-back by a tax 
loss  carry-forward.  The  profit  which  exceeds  €  511,500  and  cannot  be  offset  against  a 
potential tax loss carry-back is then offset against a tax loss carry-forward. As shown in table 
3, the tax loss carry-forward, which compensates the tighter restrictions on the loss carry-
backs in scenario 1, amounts to 9 million €. As expected, the restrictions in the tax loss carry-
back are only relevant in those three categories that contain the companies with the largest 
adjusted  gross  income  (exceeding  €  511,500).  Table  4  shows  that  the  effects  also  differ 
strongly across industries. Those industries, which traditionally contain large players, such as 
producer goods, financial intermediation or wholesale and retail trade, are especially affected 
by the reform of the tax loss carry-back.  
For both scenarios, simulation results show that past restrictions in the use of the tax loss 
carry-back  had  a  rather  small  effect  on  the  overall  corporation  tax  assessed.  This  is  true 
because only few corporations have a tax loss carry-back and an adjusted gross income in the 
previous year that exceeds the limit up to which gains can be fully offset. In addition, some of 
these corporations can offset the exceeding amount against a tax loss carry-forward.    12 
Table 3: Effects of the restrictions on the use of tax loss carry-back on corporation tax 
assessed along adjusted gross income (scenario 2) 
use of tax loss carry-back  use of tax loss carry-forward 


































      in million Euro 
                                
below    0   327 317  0    0  0    0    0    0    0 
   0   -   50 000   308 784    181    181  0   1 380   1 380    0    0 
  50 000   -   100 000   37 179    104    104  0    783    783    0    0 
  100 000   -   250 000   31 248    151    151  0   1 126   1 126    0    0 
  250 000   -   500 000   14 036    110    110  0    913    913    0    0 
  500 000   -  1 000 000   8 445    122    103  -  20   1 022   1 022    0    9 
 1 000 000   -  5 000 000   8 800    195    114  -  82   3 171   3 173    2    36 
 5 000 000 and above   3 199    60    28  -  32   19 767   19 773    7    11 
                          
      total   739 008   923    789  -  133   28 161   28 169    9    55 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations with the micro simulation model for the German corporate sector. 
 
Table 4: Effects of the restrictions on the use of tax loss carry-back on corporation tax 
assessed along industries (scenario 2) 
use of tax loss carry-back  use of tax loss carry-forward 


































      in million Euro 
                         
agriculture, forestry, fishery   8 270    6    6    0    136    136    0    0 
mining, quarrying   1 567    2    1  -  1    362    362    1    0 
consumer goods / goods for 
intermediate consumption 
goods industry 
 50 514    97    80 
-  17 
 3 845   3 846 
  1 
  7 
producers goods   59 454    133    105  -  28   8 993   8 994    1    12 
electricity and water supply   6 595    14    9  -  5    629    629    0    2 
construction   89 206    102    98  -  5    889    889    0    2 
wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of goods   163 163    162    151  -  11   2 875   2 876    1    5 
hotels and restaurants   19 951    4    4  0    136    136    0    0 
transport, storage and 
communication   26 304    36    30  -  5   1 292   1 294    2    1 
financial intermediation   11 778    74    49  -  25   1 704   1 704    0    11 
real estate and renting   58 977    81    77  -  4   1 312   1 312    0    2 
services for private sector   184 607    165    142  -  23   5 676   5 679    3    9 
services for public sector 
and households   58 622    46    37  -  9    871    872    1    4 
                  
total   739 008   923    789  -  133   28 720   28 729    9    55 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations with the micro simulation model for the German corporate sector.   13 
5.2. The effects of the minimum taxation 
By contrast, we will see that the introduction of the minimum taxation had a strong fiscal 
impact. The micro simulation (scenario 3) shows that although the minimum taxation only 
affected 180 corporations, the overall effect on the corporation tax assessed is rather strong 
and increased corporate tax revenue by € 1.1 billion. This exceeds the effect that was expected 
by the German Federal Ministry of Finance. They expected a rise of € 0.5 billion.
10 
Table 5 shows that, as expected, companies with large adjusted gross income (more than                
€  1  million)  are  affected  within  their  use  of  losses  from  the  future.  Potentially  11,243 
companies could have been subjected to the minimum taxation in 2001 as they reported an 
adjusted gross income exceeding € 1 million. As only few corporations (180 corporations) are 
effectively  limited  in  their  loss  offset  behaviour,  the  impact  on  these  companies  is 
considerable: on average, each of them has to spend an additional sum of € 6.1 million on 
corporate income tax. 
 
Table 5: Effects of the minimum taxation on corporation tax assessed along adjusted 
gross income (scenario 3)  
 
use of tax loss carry-forward 















      in million Euro 
                       
below    0  342 003    0    0    0    0 
   0   -   50 000  363 467   1 453   1 453    0    0 
  50 000   -   100 000   39 576    783    783    0    0 
  100 000   -   250 000   33 493   1 111   1 111    0    0 
  250 000   -   500 000   14 593    913    913    0    0 
  500 000   -  1 000 000   8 642    992    992    0    0 
 1 000 000   -  5 000 000   8 475   3 094   2 539  -  555    134 
 5 000 000 and above   2 768   12 484   8 346  - 4 139    968 
                   
      total   813 017   20 830   16 137  - 4 693   1 103 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations with the micro simulation for the German corporate sector. 
 
Before analysing the distributional effects of the minimum taxation across industries, it is 
rewarding to have a look at the unused tax loss carry-forward by industry. Table 6 displays 




                                                 
10 This figure includes higher tax revenue out of the local business tax that is not considered here.   14 
Table 6: Unused tax loss carry-forward by industry at the end of year 2001 
unused tax loss 
carry-forward 
average unused tax 
loss carry-forward    industry 
in million €  in thousand € 
agriculture, forestry, fishery   3 683    445 
mining, quarrying   1 734   1 107 
consumer goods / goods for intermediate consumption 
goods industry   40 880    809 
producers goods   55 098    927 
electricity and water supply   7 738   1 173 
construction   17 850    200 
wholesale and retail trade, repair of goods   37 431    229 
hotels and restaurants   3 413    171 
transport, storage and communication   31 129   1 183 
financial intermediation   17 646   1 498 
real estate and renting   49 628    841 
services for private sector   97 117    526 
services for public sector and households   24 587    419 
total  387 935  . 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations. 
 
It shows that considerable differences in the volume of unused losses from the past arise 
between  industries.  In  absolute  terms,  corporations  manufacturing  producer  goods  and 
corporations providing services for the private sector account for most of the unused tax loss 
carry-forward.  In  the  latter  this  large  share  corresponds  to  the  significant  number  of 
corporations within this industry. This becomes obvious when looking at the average tax loss 
carry-forward  within  an  industry.  While  companies  in  the  industry  with  services  for  the 
private sector have a tax loss carry-forward of € 526 thousand on average, other industries 
have  considerably  more  tax  loss  carry-forwards  on  average  (financial  intermediation:             
€ 1.5 million, transportation or electricity/water supply: € 1.2 million and mining/quarrying:  
€ 1.1 million). As expected, these industries are mostly affected by the minimum taxation 
(table 7). In relative terms, mining and quarrying companies are most likely to be affected by 
the minimum taxation (0.13 % of companies within this industry). In absolute terms, it is the 
industry  providing  services  for  the  private  sector  where  most  corporations  fall  upon  the 
minimum  taxation  (39  corporations).  As  we  have  seen,  this  industry  accounts  for  most 
companies so that this is not surprising. More interesting is to consider the increase in the 
corporation tax assessed: Companies in the industry of transport, storage and communication 
confront  a  sharp  increase  of  29  %  of  their  corporation  tax  burden.  This  implies  strong 
distributional effects of the minimum taxation.   15 
Table 7: Effects of the minimum taxation on corporation tax assessed along industries 
(scenario 3) 
 
use of tax loss carry-forward 











fiscal effect of the 
restriction 
      in million Euro  in % 
                    
agriculture, forestry, fishery   8 608    193    184  -  8    2  3.8% 
mining, quarrying   1 567    166    108  -  59    15  13.9% 
consumer goods / goods for 
intermediate consumption goods 
industry 
 50 822   2 213   1 738 
-  475    117  3.4% 
producers goods   63 225   3 685   2 637  - 1 048    254  8.3% 
electricity and water supply   7 015   1 110    810  -  300    40  3.6% 
construction   92 339    757    688  -  68    17  3.2% 
wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
goods   162 906   2 425   2 064  -  362    88  3.8% 
hotels and restaurants   21 174    221    193  -  28    6  7.3% 
transport, storage and communication   28 305   2 016   1 376  -  640    160  29.1% 
financial intermediation   12 051   1 153    793  -  359    88  2.4% 
real estate and renting   65 016   1 404   1 178  -  225    55  6.1% 
services for private sector   230 268   4 615   3 623  -  992    231  3.8% 
services for public sector and 
households   69 721    871    744  -  128    31  4.2% 
               
total   813 017   20 830   16 137  - 4 693   1 103  4.9% 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations with the micro simulation for the German corporate sector. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In recent years we have seen the tax loss carry-forward skyrocketing. In 2001, unused losses 
from the past attained a volume of € 388 billion. 443,076 corporations showed a tax loss 
carry-forward in 2001, i.e. 54 % of all companies subject to corporate income tax. Thus, one 
would expect that corporations extensively make use of these losses from the past. However, 
the data show that only a small share of tax loss carry-forwards is used every year.  
 
One potential reason for this puzzle is that tax offset restrictions have been tightened in the 
past.  In  this  paper  these  new  regulations  are  briefly  explained  and  discussed.  In  an 
international perspective, German loss offset regulations are still rather generous as many 
other countries do not allow for a tax loss carry-back at all. However, tax asymmetries, i.e. the 
unequal treatment of gains and losses in taxation, have been aggravated by the reforms. While 
corporate profits are immediately taxed, losses do not necessarily lead to an immediate tax 
refund. A form of immediate tax refund is only given if companies suffering losses can fully   16 
offset these losses against profits from the previous year. From a point of view of public 
finance, these tax asymmetries are undesirable because they lead to economic inefficiencies: 
Researchers  empirically  showed  that  they  distort  entrepreneurial  decisions  regarding  e.g. 
investments or financing. 
 
To evaluate whether it is due to the newly introduced tax loss offset restrictions that the tax 
loss carry-forward steadily increases, I have empirically analysed two major reforms. Both 
analyses are based on a newly developed model for the German corporate sector. The first 
reform concerns the tax loss carry-back, which was tightened in two steps. In this paper, it 
was  shown  that  the  restriction  in  the  volume  of  the  tax  loss  carry-back  to  €  1  million 
generated little additional fiscal revenue (+ € 10 million). It became also clear that the further 
limitation of the tax loss carry-back to € 511,500 in 2001 was more effective. The latter 
generated a plus in fiscal revenue in the amount of € 55 million. As expected before the 
tightness  of  the  tax  loss  carry-back  has  been  relevant  for  large  companies  only.  The 
percentage of companies affected by the restriction in the use of their tax loss carry-back is 
nevertheless surprisingly small (0.5 %, 366 companies). 
 
As a second reform, the minimum taxation, which was introduced in 2004, was evaluated. It 
turned out that the minimum taxation is very effective in generating tax revenue: the micro 
simulations showed an increase of tax revenues by 1.1 billion €. Like the reform of the tax 
loss carry-back the minimum taxation only affects corporations with a large adjusted gross 
income (more than € 1 million). The distributional effects across industries show that those 
industries with traditionally large players are mostly affected. These are mining and quarrying 
companies and the firms in the industry transport, storage and communication. On the whole, 
the  minimum  taxation  is  effective  for  no  more  than  180  companies  (11,243  reported  an 
adjusted gross income exceeding 1 million € and could potentially be subject to the minimum 
taxation in 2001). This means that these corporations face a much higher tax burden than 
before. On average, they pay an additional corporate income tax of € 6.1 million.  
 
Even though the minimum taxation was more effective than expected both reforms can only 
partly explain why the volume of tax losses carried forward has been skyrocketing in recent 
years without being offset against present profits. Hence, the driving force of increasing tax 
loss carry-forwards remains in the dark.    17 
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Table A1: Effects of the restrictions on the use of tax loss carry-back on corporation tax 
assessed along adjusted gross income (scenario 1) 
use of tax loss carry-back  use of tax loss carry-forward 


































      in million Euro 
                                
below    0   327 317    0    0    0    0    0    0    0 
   0   -   50 000   308 784    181    181  0   1 360   1 360    0    0 
  50 000   -   100 000   37 179    104    104  0    779    779    0    0 
  100 000   -   250 000   31 248    151    151  0   1 116   1 116    0    0 
  250 000   -   500 000   14 036    110    110  0    902    902    0    0 
  500 000   -  1 000 000   8 445    122    122  0   1 001   1 001    0    0 
 1 000 000   -  5 000 000   8 800    195    182  -  13   3 065   3 065    0    6 
 5 000 000 and above   3 199    60    51  -  8   20 498   20 498    0    4 
                           
      total   739 008   923   901  -  21   28 720   28 720    0    10 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations with the micro simulation model for the German corporate sector. 
 
Table A2: Effects of the restrictions on the use of tax loss carry-back on corporation tax 
assessed along industries (scenario 1) 
use of tax loss carry-back  use of tax loss carry-forward 


































      in million Euro 
                          
agriculture, forestry, fishery   8 270   6    6    0    136    136    0    0 
mining, quarrying   1 567    2    2    0    362    362    0    0 
consumer goods / goods for 
intermediate consumption 
goods industry 
 50 514    97    95  - 2   3 845   3 845 
  0    1 
producers goods   59 454    133    126  -  7   8 993   8 993    0    3 
electricity and water supply   6 595    14    13  -  1    629    629    0    0 
construction   89 206    102    102  0    889    889    0    0 
wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of goods   163 163    162    162  0   2 875   2 875    0    0 
hotels and restaurants   19 951    4    4    0    136    136    0    0 
transport, storage and 
communication   26 304    36    36  0   1 292   1 292    0    0 
financial intermediation   11 778    74    69  -  5   1 704   1 704    0    2 
real estate and renting   58 977    81    81  0   1 312   1 312    0    0 
services for private sector   184 607    165    163  -  2   5 676   5 676    0    1 
services for public sector and 
households   58 622    46    42  -  4    871    871    0    2 
                     
total   739 008   923   901  -  21   28 720   28 720    0    10 
Source: German Federal Statistical Office, own calculations with the micro simulation model for the German corporate sector. 